r/consciousness • u/thisthinginabag • 11h ago
Three puzzles about subjectivity (beyond the hard problem)
This isn’t meant as a “dunking on physicalism” post. I just want to lay out some features of subjectivity that I find interesting, partly because it’s not obvious how physicalism should make sense of them.
Obviously the mere existence of subjective experience is puzzling for the physicalist worldview. It doesn't seem that a fully physical, reductive account of consciousness is possible since experiences have properties that are not publicly observable. This is the hard problem. But even setting it aside, any physicalist who takes subjectivity seriously faces a few related puzzles:
1. The subject boundary problem
Subjectivity seems to give us a clear criterion for speaking of real boundaries between different subjects. When you stub your toe, I don't feel your pain. When I have a thought, you don't have my thought. Similarly, for anything in the world to affect my experience, it has to interact with the surface of my body first.
But when we look at the world objectively, boundaries between different objects seem to only exist nominally. There's no clear criteria by which we can separate the table from the rest of the room. A table is just a more or less stable configuration of particles that we have labeled for convenience. Look at matter closely enough and eventually you'll only find fluctuations in fields that extend everywhere.
Taking a functional perspective doesn't seem to help, either. We might say a car consists only of the parts it needs to function. But a car can’t function without a road, air for combustion, gravity, an atmosphere, and so on, until eventually the whole universe is implicated.
The same principle applies to nervous systems, or any physical system we may associate with consciousness. Neither structure nor function seems to give that system a real boundary. But if we take subjectivity seriously, then it seems this boundary must exist. How does physicalism account for a boundary that appears to really exist but have no physical basis?
2. The problem of intentionality
This is probably the most discussed of the three. Experiences seem to have intentional relationships with the things they are about. When I look at the moon, there seems to be a genuine connection between the moon and my experience of it. Even thinking about the moon seems to put my thoughts in a particular relation to it.
When we look at the world objectively, it's not clear that we see anything that obtains this sort of relationship. The Chinese Room thought experiment is a way of illustrating this, though a better example now may be LLMs. The right algorithm can produce intelligent and convincingly human speech about the moon, but the connection that seems present whenever I look at or think about the moon seems absent from this process. The same can even apply to a person trained to produce sentences in a language they don’t understand. What they say might be legibly about the moon, but their speech seems to lack the 'about-ness' that is present when someone speaks or thinks about the moon with understanding.
3. The problem of the present
In our subjective experience of the world, there is always a present moment - a privileged moment T. It’s hard to deny that this present moment is real, and so that, for any subject, some things have already happened and others haven’t yet. We also seem to make rational decisions based on which of those categories an event falls into.
But from an objective standpoint, there is no justification for any privileged moment. What belongs in the set of "things that have already happened" and "things that haven't yet happened" is completely relative and dependent on where you place T. The idea that there is ever a privileged present moment is unjustified from the physicalist perspective, along with the idea that, for any given subject, some events really have happened and others really haven’t yet, or that our reasoning about the difference is rational rather than arbitrary.